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Cross-border Comparative Advertising in the 
European Union 
INTRODUCTION 
Comparative advertising is a sales promotion device that compares 
products or services. l It can be a useful source of information to the 
consumer, as well as an effective promotional tool for the advertiser.2 
Although a widely accepted practice in the United States, several Euro-
pean Union [EU] Member States consider it in bad taste and unnec-
essarily violative of the competitor.3 Therefore, they either ban or 
restrict the practice of comparative advertising.4 The European Com-
mission [CommissionJ5 has been trying to change this attitude. 6 
A primary reason for creating the EU was to develop a Single Market. 
As the EU succeeds in eliminating most other non-tariff barriers to 
intra-EU trade, national differences in non-harmonized areas come 
into the foreground as potential and significant obstacles to pan-Euro-
pean marketing and, thus, to the achievement of a Single Market.7 
Likewise, the differences in Member States's advertising laws could 
emerge as obstacles to pan-European marketing.8 If some Member 
I Opinion on the Amended Proposal for a Council Directive concerning Comparative Adver-
tising and Amending Directive 84/450 concerning Misleading Advertising, 1992 OJ. (C 49) 35, 
35 [hereinafter Opinion on Amended Proposal]. 
2 See id. 
3 See Diane Summers, Light Touch in Battle for Brands, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994 at 17 [here-
inafter Summers, Light Touch in Battle for Brands]. 
4 See id.; see also Amended Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive concerning Comparative Advertising and Amending Directive 84/450 concerning Mis-
leading Advertising, 1994 OJ. (C 136) 4,5 [hereinafter Amended Proposal]. See discussion infra 
Part II for examples of restrictive national policies. 
5 The Commission is the supranational governing body of the EU and represents all the 
Member States. SeeD. LASOK &J.W. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 105-09 (1973). The Commission is made up of 17 members 
appointed by the governments of the Member States. See id. It is the executive body of the EU 
government and chief policy maker. See id. 
6 See Opinion on Amended Proposal, supra note 1, at 35. 
7 See Commission to Issue Green Paper on Cross-Border Promotion Methods, Eurowatch, Vol. 6, No. 
2, Apr. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, Int'l Library, Europe File [hereinafter Commission to Issue 
Green Paper]. 
8 See Awaiting Commission's Green Paper in European Community, Economist Intelligence Unit, 
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States allow comparative advertising and others do not, the effect is a 
restriction upon advertising and upon the free movement of goods.9 A 
company with a comparative advertisement may choose not to run it 
at all in a Member State that prohibits comparative advertising, thereby 
reducing the product's marketability and the level of imports and trade 
into that nation. lO Such restrictive laws amount to trade barriers.11 
Meanwhile, "the increased supply and demand triggered by the open-
ing of borders will mean greater use of advertising for product promo-
tion" and should ultimately lead to the increased influx of goods into 
other Member States.12 
The Commission has recently launched steps to lift remaining and 
potential trade barriers in hopes of achieving a legal situation that 
respects the sovereignty of Member States, while maintaining the ED 
goal of the free movement of goods across national borders.13 One such 
effort is the Amended Commission Proposal for a European Parliament 
and Council Directive concerning Comparative Advertising and Amend-
ing Directive 84/450 concerning Misleading Advertising [Amended 
Proposal].14 If the Commission adopts the Amended Proposal as a 
directive, Member States will have to change their existing laws with 
respect to cross-border comparative advertising. 15 
This Note considers the status of ED law on comparative advertising 
in light of European Court of Justice [ECJ] decisions and further 
addresses the need for a directive as an embodiment of a cohesive 
policy on comparative advertising. Part I evaluates the background 
Bus. Eur., Mar. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File [hereinafter Awaiting 
Green Paper); see also, Commission to Issue Green Paper, supra note 7. 
9 See Case C-362/88, GB-INNO-BM v. Confederation du commerce luxembourgeois, 1990 
E.C.R. 667, 676, 61 C.M.L.R. 801 (1991-92); see also, Germany-Advertising Regulations, 1993 
National Trade Data Bank, Market Reports, Nov. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, Int'l Library, 
Europe File [hereinafter Germany-Advertising Regulations). 
10 See INNO, 1990 E.C.R. at 676; Germany-Advertising Regulations, supra note 9. Often, differ-
ing national standards for comparative advertising make advertising campaigns across borders 
near impossible. For example, the US media welcomed a Pepsi-Cola advertisement which com-
pared itself to Coca-Cola, but Pepsi had to modifY the advertisement several times to eliminate 
the word "Coca-Cola» in several EU Member States. Coke Lawsuit Forces Pepsi Ad Off the Air in 
Italy, Euromarketing, vol. 6, no. 41, Jun. 29, 1993, available in LEXlS, News Library, Zwld1 File 
[hereinafter Coke Lawsuit Forces Pepsi Off the Air). Italy banned the advertisement altogether. Id. 
11 See INNO, 1990 E.C.R. at 677. 
12 See Opinion on Amended Proposal, supra note 1, at 35. 
13 See Amended Proposal, supra note 4; Commission to Issue Green Paper, supra note 7; Awaiting 
Green Paper, supra note 8. 
14 Amended Proposal, supra note 4. 
15Winfried Tilmann, Cross-Border Comparative Advertising, 25 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & 
COPYRIGHT LAw 333, 333 (1994). 
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events leading to the Amended Proposal. Part II discusses the status of 
the comparative advertising law in various Member States. Part III 
analyzes the specific provisions of the Amended Proposal. Part IV 
addresses whether the Amended Proposal, if adopted as a directive will 
conflict with the idea of subsidiarity espoused by the Maastricht Treaty 
and concludes that the concept of subsidiarity should be subordinate 
to the greater EU objective of the achievement of a Single Market. Part 
IV also addresses the legality of the Amended Proposal with respect to 
whether restrictions placed by Member States on comparative advertis-
ing conflict with article 30 of the Maastricht Treaty in light of recent 
EC] decisions. It concludes that the ECl's rulings demonstrate a slant 
towards the harmonization of Member States's laws on comparative 
advertising and that the rulings will have an effect equivalent to that 
of the Amended Proposal once parties bring their disputes before the 
EC]. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE AMENDED PROPOSAL TO THE DIRECTIVE ON 
COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING 
EU advertising legislation began in 1978 with the Misleading Adver-
tising Directive that merely ensured that advertising does not mislead 
consumers.16 Initially, article IV of the Directive on Misleading Adver-
tising authorized comparative advertising. 17 Although the European 
Parliament supported that directive, one Member State opposed the 
provision on comparative advertising and the Commission dropped 
it from the directive. IS The Commission instead adopted Directive 
84/450/EEC on misleading advertising, leaving out provisions regard-
ing comparative advertising. 19 In 1991, the Commission published a 
new draft directive on comparative advertising20, and on April 21, 1994, 
the Commission published the Amended Proposal which included 
provisions allowing comparative advertising.21 Due to the tension cre-
16 See Commission Draft Directive on Misleading and Unfair Advertising, 1978 OJ. (C 70) 4; 
see also, EC Reviewing Policy on Advertising, Bus. Eur., Apr. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Int'l 
Library, Europe File [hereinafter EC Reviewing Policy on Advertising]. 
17 Opinion on Amended Proposal, supra note 1, at 35. 
18 See id. 
19 Council Directive Relating to the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative 
Provisions of the Member States Concerning Misleading Advertising, 84/450, 1984 OJ. (L250) 
20 [hereinafter Misleading Advertising Directive]. 
20 Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Comparative Advertising and Amending Direc-
tive 84/450 Concerning Misleading Advertising, COM(91)147 final at 343. 
21 See Amended Proposal, supra note 4, at 5. See discussion infra Part III. Article 189 of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community explains that a directive requires each Member 
204 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XIX, No. 1 
ated by conflicting national laws, the Commission had trouble obtain-
ing consensus among the Member States and therefore, the Commis-
sion has not yet passed the Amended Proposal as a directive.22 
II. DIFFERING COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING 
LAWS OF EU MEMBER STATES 
The Preamble of the Amended Proposal stresses the importance of 
the achievement of a cohesive internal market. It also presents, how-
ever, the difficulties in achieving a unified European Market, with 
respect to comparative advertising. 23 The Preamble states, in perti-
nent part: 
Whereas the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
of the Member States concerning comparative advertising 
differ widely; whereas advertising reaches beyond the fron-
tiers and is received on the territory of other Member States; 
whereas the acceptance or non-acceptance of comparative 
advertising according to the various national laws may consti-
tute an obstacle to the free movement of goods and services 
and create distortions of competition .... 24 
Two thirds ofEU countries restrict or ban comparative advertising.25 
The disparity in treatment of comparative advertising results from the 
different rules and traditions each country espouses regarding unfair 
competition in general,26 Some Member States oppose comparative 
advertising because of the adverse press it gives competitors and be-
cause it creates an opportunity to reap a benefit at a competitor's 
expense.27 Furthermore, opponents of comparative advertising not only 
believe it encourages misrepresentation, but also that it takes away 
State to enact legislation that will produce the desired results. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EURO-
PEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY art. 189 [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. 
22 See generally, Tilmann, supra note 15, at 333; see also Commission to Issue Green Paper, supra 
note 7. 
23 See Amended Proposal, supra note 4, at 5. 
24 See id. 
25 See Coke Lawsuit Forces Pepsi Ad Off the Air, supra note 10. 
26 Theo Bodewig, The Regulation of Comparative Advertising in the European Union, 9 TUL. EUR. 
& CIV. L. F. 179, 190 (1994). 
27 See Opinion on Amended Proposal, supra note 1, at 35-36; UK: Government Comparative Ad 
Plans Run into Tory Rebel Troubles, Reuter Textline Campaign, Feb. 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, 
Int'l Library, Europe File [hereinafter UK: Government Comparative Ad Plans Run into Tory Rebel 
Troubles]. 
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from the quality of the products advertised because the marketing is 
not done on the product's merits but rather on highlighting the faults 
of another.28 
On January 18, 1992, the French amended their civil code to allow 
comparative advertising as long as it is "fair, true, objective and not 
misleading to consumers."29 In the United Kingdom (UK), the New 
Trademark Act of 1994 covers comparative advertising in that it allows 
the use of trademarks in comparative advertising as long as the adver-
tisement complies with "honest practices in industrial or commercial 
matters. "30 The law limits comparative advertising in that it allows 
mention of a rival product in advertisements only when the competitor 
has given its permission.3l 
The Benelux32 countries view comparative advertising as an infringe-
ment upon trademark rights and therefore forbid it.33 The Benelux 
Uniform Trademark Act considers comparative advertising an infringe-
ment of the exclusive trademark rights of the owner of the trademark.34 
Belgium prohibits advertising that is misleading and disparaging.35 In 
Belgium, a 1991 law prohibits comparative advertising where the other 
vendor is identifiable.36 In the Netherlands, no outright prohibition of 
comparative advertising exists; the law only prohibits disparaging and 
misleading advertisingY The Netherlands, however, complies with the 
Benelux Uniform Trademark Act which forbids the use of another's 
trademark in advertising. 38 
Italy does not prohibit comparative advertising, as long as it is not 
misleading.39 Spain adopted a more lenient position. Article 10 of its 
1991 Law on Unfair Competition allows some comparative advertising 
but "forbids comparisons that relate to factors that are not similar, 
28 See UK: Government Comparative Ad Plans Run into Tory Rebel Troubles, supra note 27. 
29 France-Advertising Services, 1994 National Trade Data Bank, Market Reports, Jan. 14, 1994, 
available in LEXIS, Int'l Library, Europe File [hereinafter France-Advertising Services]. 
30 See Bodewig, supra note 26, at 198. 
31 See id. 
32 Benelux is the common name for the three countries of Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
~uxembourg. 
33 See Tilmann, supra note 15, at 334. 
34 Benelux Uniform Trademark Act, art. 31 (a) (1), (2). 
35 Art. 32 no. 2 Law on Commercial Practices (1991). 
36Id. If the Commission adopts the Amended Proposal as a directive, Belgium necessarily would 
have to change its law. See Bodewig, supra note 26, at 192. 
37 Art. 6: 163 j Burgerlijk Wetbook. 
38 Bodewig, supra note 26, at 194. 
39 See Art. 2598 no. 2 Codice Civile. 
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relevant or comparable."40 In contrast, Portugal allows, but strictly 
limits, the practice of comparative advertising.41 In 1991, Greece simi-
larly adopted a Consumer Protection Law that allows the limited use 
of comparative advertising.42 Denmark generally allows comparative 
advertising provided that it is not misleading or disparaging.43 
German law espouses one of the most restrictive national policies 
against comparative advertising, and provides an illustrative example 
of the conflicts that can arise due to the divergent laws on comparative 
advertising. 44 Under §§ 1 and 3 of the Law Against Unfair Competition, 
Germany limits comparative advertising to cases where the advertiser 
can invoke a "sufficient" or legitimate reason for using it and the 
advertisement is restricted to true and objective information and does 
not go beyond what is necessary.45 Such a strict law produces conflict 
when companies from other Member States try to advertise in Ger-
many. For example, price comparisons in print advertisements were 
illegal in Germany.46 Due to a recent ECl ruling, however, Germany 
must now allow such price comparisons for other EU companies ad-
vertising within its bordersY Due to the conflict between Germany's 
desire to keep its restrictive law, and the EU's inclination towards 
relaxing its laws regarding comparative advertising, German national 
companies suffer while other EU member companies benefit.48 
Part III. THE AMENDED PROPOSAL To THE DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON 
COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING 
The text of the Amended Proposal attempts to harmonize the dif-
fering laws of the Member States by allowing comparative advertising 
under certain conditions.49 The Commission broadly defines compara-
tive advertising, as "any advertising which explicitly or by implication 
identifies a competitor or goods or services of the same kind offered 
40 See Art. 10 no. 1,2, Art. 7 and Art. 9 Law no. 3/1991 of Jan. 10, 1991 on Unfair Competition, 
B.O.E. No. 1O,Jan. 11, 1991; Art. 6 (c) Law No. 341988 of Nov. 11, 1988, B.O.E. no. 274 Nov. 15, 
1988. 
41 Bodewig, supra note 26, at 197. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. at 195. 
44 See generally, Germany-Advertising Regulations, supra note 9; Tilmann, supra note 15, at 335. 
45 Bodewig, supra note 26, at 193. 
46 See Germany-Advertising Regulations, supra note 9. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 See Amended Proposal, supra note 4, at 5-8. 
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by the competitor. "50 The preamble states the Commission's objectives. 
First, the Commission emphasizes the value of better information for 
consumers.51 Second, the Commission values strengthening competi-
tion, which would benefit both the consumer and the advertiser. 52 
Finally, the Commission seeks to harmonize the laws of the Member 
States in order to achieve the development of a Single Market.53 The 
Commission balances these goals with the need for the protection of 
consumers against deception and competitors against disparagement.54 
Member States must permit comparative advertising and not regulate 
it more stringently than would the Amended Proposal. 
Under the Amended Proposal, comparative advertising shall be al-
lowed "only provided that it objectively compares the material, rele-
vant, always verifiable, fairly chosen and representative features of 
competing goods and services."55 The advertisement must not create 
the risk of confusion between the advertiser and a competitor or 
between the advertiser's trade marks, trade names, other distinguish-
ing marks, goods or services of those of a competitor.56 It must not 
refer to the personality or personal situation of a competitor.57 The 
Commission, through the Amended Proposal, seeks to preserve the 
dissemination of information to consumers, yet seeks to diminish the 
risk of misrepresentation by eradicating its negative characteristics, 
such as the comparison of dissimilar goods.58 
The provisions of the Amended Proposal are rather vague, however, 
and thus, if passed as a directive, will allow the Member States to 
continue with their national laws until they are tested in the courts.59 
Further litigation in the ECJ will bring more definition to the law. Thus 
far, the ECl has demonstrated its tendency to emphasize harmoniza-
tion and the goal of creating a Single Market by consistently allowing 
com parative advertising. 60 
50 See id. at 5. 
5l See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 See Amended Proposal, supra note 4, at 5. 
55Id. at 7. 
56 See id. at 8. 
57Id. 
58 See Opinion on Amended Proposal, supra note 1, at 35-36. 
59 See Bodewig, supra note 26, at 208. 
60 See Case C-362/88, GB-INNO-BM v. Confederation du commerce luxembourgeois, 1990 
E.C.R. 667, 676, 61 C.M.L.R. 801 (1991-92); see also Case C-126/91, Schutzverband gegen 
Unwesen in der Wirtschaft eV v. Yves Rocher GmbH, 1993 OJ. (C 172) 6. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
A. WOULD THE ADOPTION OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE 
DIRECTIVE ON COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING CONFLICT WITH THE 
EU CONCEPT OF SUBSIDIARITY? 
Subsidiarity is a central tenet of The Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union.61 The Maastricht Treaty provides that 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 
the Community shall take action, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives 
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
Community.62 
According to this principle of subsidiarity, EU institutions should not 
act, even when permitted, if they could serve their objectives at or 
below the Member State leve1.63 Subsidiarity is designed to ensure that 
the Commission does not needlessly trample upon the sovereignty of 
each Member State.64 The values placed on sovereignty and self-deter-
mination of the Member States are not without costs inherent in the 
principle of subsidiarity. Such costs include the possible impairment 
of a common internal market and, more generally, its interference with 
the efficient attainment of the Community's substantive policy goals.65 
To determine if a Commission action complies with the idea of 
subsidiarity, the Commission weighs the objectives of the differing 
national laws against the desired EU objective.66 Member States seek to 
limit comparative advertising due to a belief that it is "more likely to 
add to the sum of disinformation being showered on consumers than 
the sum of worthwhile information that the consumer needs for form-
ing a judgment and a choice. "67 In contrast, the Commission seeks to 
61 Treaty of the European Union & Final Act, 7 Feb. 1992, 311.L.M. 247 [hereinafter Maastricht 
Treaty]; see also, George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 332,334 (1994). 
62 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 61, art. 3b. 
63 See Bermann, supra note 61, at 334. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. at 336. 
66 See UK: Government Comparative Ad Plans Run into Tory Rebel Troubles, supra note 27. 
67 See id. 
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encourage comparative advertising, claiming that the right to con-
sumer protection and information includes, " ... the right to informa-
tion [as] among the basic rights of consumers ... "68 Furthermore, the 
Commission states that, " ... comparative advertising, when it compares 
details that are relevant, always verifiable and neither misleading nor 
unfair, may be a legitimate means of informing consumers to their 
advan tage. . . "69 
Article 129 (a) of the Maastricht Treaty expressly limits the EU's 
ability to promote consumer protection unless the EU action "supports 
and supplements the policy pursued by the Member States."70 In Ver-
band Sozialer Wettbewerb e V v. Clinique Laboratories SNC and Estee Lauder 
Cosmetics GmbH, the ECJ focused on the interpretation of articles 3071 
and 36 of the Maastricht Treaty with regard to the prohibited use of a 
cosmetic product name liable to mislead consumers.72 In this case, the 
German government accused Estee Lauder Cosmetics of misleading 
advertising.73 The German government felt that the name of the com-
pany and its products, "Clinique," was too similar to the word for 
"clinic" in German and therefore connoted medical qualities. 74 
The ECJ ruled that prohibiting the use of the name "Clinique" was 
not necessary for consumer protection.75 The ECl interpreted article 
30 as precluding national measures that prohibit the importation and 
marketing of products classified and packaged as cosmetics on the 
ground that the product bears the name "Clinique. "76 In dicta, how-
ever, the Court stated that individual Member States are charged with 
deciding the degree of protection necessary, even though the rules 
adopted may create trade barriers. 77 The case noted one of the main 
68 See Amended Proposal, supra note 4, at 5. 
69 See id. 
70 See Bermann, supra note 61, at 346 n.46. 
71 Article 30 of the Maastricht Treaty provides, in pertinent part, that "quantitative restrictions 
on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice ... be prohibited 
between the Member States." Maastricht Treaty, supra note 61, art. 30. 
72 See Case 315/92, Verband Soialer Wettbewerb eV v. Clinique Laboratories SNC and Estee 
Lauder Cosmetics GmbH, 1994, available in LEXIS, Int'l Library, Eccase File, at 3. 
73 See id. at 3-4. 
74 See id. at 3. The plaintiff, a German association that had standing to bring legal proceedings 
with a view to securing the enforcement of the German law against unfair competition, claimed 
that a proportion of the sector of the market concerned might attribute prophylactic or curative 
medical effects to the "Clinique" range of cosmetics. See id. 
75 See id. at 14. 
76 See Case 315/92, Verband Soialer Wettbewerb eV v. Clinique Laboratories SNC and Estee 
Lauder Cosmetics GmbH, 1994, available in LEXIS, Int'l Library, Eccase File, at 14. 
77 See id. at 5-7. 
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tenets behind the principle of subsidiarity: that although there may be 
specific differences in linguistic, social and cultural conditions that 
mislead consumers in one country but not in another, it remains 
primarily a matter for national legislatures to determine the level of 
protection desired in each country.78 The Commission may impose 
rules and standards on the Member States, but only in a very general 
manner.79 
On the other hand, "[u]nder article lOOA of the Single European 
Act, the Commission may impose regulations which are necessary 
to further the EU's progression toward complete integration."8o The 
Amended Proposal is a way of harmonizing existing EU law in a 
manner that will avoid barriers to trade.81 If the principle of subsidiarity 
protects the many differing national restrictions, it is doubtful that 
progression towards a Single Market is possible.82 According to a Brit-
ish Advertising Association's expert on Europe, " ... subsidiarity could 
prove to be the fatal catch-all excuse for the maintenance of national 
trade protection."83 
Subsidiarity alone, however, cannot be the sole justification for not 
implementing the Amended Proposa1.84 The objectives of the Amended 
Proposal are consistent with the main principle behind the concept of 
a Single Market: reduced barriers to trade.85 Subsidiarity itself should 
be secondary to that prime objective. The EU institutions exist to act 
in situations where Member States's legislation acts contrary to the 
aims of the Single Market.86 Some degree of sovereignty must be sac-
rificed in order to achieve the ultimate goal of the Single Market.87 
The scope of the Amended Proposal, if adopted as a directive, could 
be reduced substantially to comply with the concept of subsidiarity.88 
78 See id. at 7. 
79 See id. 
80 Jennifer A. Lesny, Tobacco Proves Addictive: The European Community's Stalled Proposal to Ban 
Tobacco Advertising, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 149, 160 (1993-94). 
81 See id. 
82 See Diane Summers, Breaking Down Euro--Barriers, FIN. TIMES LTD., Mar. 17, 1994, available 
in LEXIS, Int'l Library, Europe File [hereinafter Summers, Breaking Down Euro--BarriersJ. 
83 See id. 
84 See Case 315/92, Verband Soialer Wettbewerb eV v. Clinique Laboratories SNC and Estee 
Lauder Cosmetics GmbH, 1994, available in LEXIS, Int'l Library, Eccase File, at 6-7. 
85 See Opinion on Amended Proposal, supra note 1, at 35. 
86 See Bermann, supra note 61, at 346. 
87 See id. at 335. 
88 Commission Reports on Application of Subsidiarity, REUTER EUR. COMM. REpORTS, Dec. 8, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, World Library, Revec File [hereinafter Commission Reports on Application of 
Subsidiarity J. 
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In December 1992, the Commission stated that several proposals needed 
to be narrowed due to the principle of subsidiarity.89 The Commission 
categorized the proposals as either rules and regulations to be revised, 
rules and regulations to be simplified, or rules and regulations to be 
repealed.90 The Amended Proposal is among the rules and regulations 
to be revised.91 If a directive contains detailed restrictions and rules, 
the Member State retains less control. Such a result would make the 
directive more congruent with the primary goal of a Single Market, 
but it would conflict with the principle of subsidiarity.92 The adoption 
of a detailed directive would better serve the goals of the achievement 
of a Single Market and fewer barriers to trade. Without a detailed 
directive, the Member States would be left to their own devices. They 
would not be required to change their laws, and the objectives of the 
directive would not be served. 
Where national laws are extremely divergent, the analysis should 
move outside of the realm of subsidiarity because Member States will 
not break down restrictive barriers on their own.93 The extensive use, 
or abuse, of the principle of subsidiarity could defeat the purpose 
behind any directive.94 Therefore, subsidiarity should be trumped by 
the general need for consensus to achieve the broader goal of a Single 
Market. 
B. European Court of Justice Favors Dismantling Of Trade Barriers 
In recent decisions, the ECJ has demonstrated a tendency to apply 
article 30 in order to hold that national restrictions on comparative 
advertising violate the principle of the free movement of goods and 
amount to a restriction on trade between Member States.95 The Court 
hesitates to uphold restrictions by Member States on the freedom of 
movement of goods.96 In the landmark case, CB-INNO-BM v. Conjed-
89 [d. 
90 [d. 
91 [d. 
92 See id. at 10. 
93 See Tilmann, supra note 15, at 335. 
94 BEUC Calls on German Presidency to Focus on Consumer Policy, Reuter Eur. Comm. Reports, 
Jun. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Revec File. 
95 See Case 315/92, Verband Soialer Wettbewerb eV v. Clinique Laboratories SNC and Estee 
Lauder Cosmetics GmbH, 1994, available in LEXlS, Int'l Library, Eccase File, at 10; see also, Case 
G-362/88, GB-INNO-BM v. Confederation du commerce luxembourgeois, 1990 E.C.R. 667, 674, 
686,61 C.M.L.R. 801 (1991-1992). 
96Jerome Huet, Recent Developments in Consumer Protection in the EC, 16 HASTINGS INT'L. & 
COMPo L. REv. 583, 588 (1993). 
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eration due commerce luxembourgeois, the Court refused to approve the 
prohibitions on advertising of special sales events and on advertising 
using crossed-out prices.97 The ECJ emphasized the role of consumer 
information as a factor in consumer protection.98 
In that case, CCL, a non-profit organization, claimed to represent 
the interests of Luxembourg traders, while GB-INNO-BM operated 
supermarkets in Belgian territory, near the Belgian-Luxembourg bor-
der.99 GB-INNO-BM distributed advertising leaflets on Luxembourg 
and Belgian territory, and CCL alleged that the advertising violated 
the law of unfair competition.100 Under the law of unfair competition, 
sales offers involving a temporary price reduction may not state the 
duration of the offer or refer to previous prices.10l The Court reasoned 
that legislation restricting or prohibiting certain forms of advertising 
and certain means of sales promotion may operate to restrict the 
volume of trade because it affects marketing opportunities in violation 
of articles 30 and 36 of the Maastricht Treaty.102 It concluded that 
advertising of sales offers involving a price reduction and stating the 
duration of the offer and the prices previously charged is prohibited 
by the Luxembourg legislation but permitted by the provisions in force 
in Belgium.103 The Court ruled that an advertisement that is legal in 
the state in which it originated cannot be banned by the laws of any 
Member State that it may reach.104 
Although the setting was not for the free movement of goods per se, 
the Court held that article 30 still applied.l05 It reasoned that EU policy 
establishes a close link between protecting the consumer and providing 
the consumer with information.l06 The Court decided that article 30 
should apply because the effect of restrictive measures on comparative 
advertising resembled that of quantitative restrictions on imports within 
the meaning of article 30.107 
97 See Case G-362/88, GB-INNO-BM v. Confederation du commerce luxembourgeois, 1990 
E.C.R. at 674. 
98 See id. at 672. 
jj9 See id. at 669. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
102 See Case G-362/88, GB-INNO-BM v. Confederation du commerce luxembourgeois, 1990 
E.C.R. 667, 676, 61 C.M.L.R 801 (1991-92). 
103 See id. at 672. 
104 See id. at 674. 
105 See id. at 676. 
106 See id. at 679. 
J07 See Case G-362/88, GB-INNO-BM v. Confederation du commerce luxembourgeois, 1990 
E.C.R. 667, 678, 61 C.M.L.R. 801 (1991-92). 
1996] COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING 213 
In Procureur de roi v. Benoit and Gustave Dassonville, the Court rea-
soned that all trading rules enacted by Member States which are 
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, 
intra-Community trade should be considered measures having an ef-
fect equivalent to quantitative restrictions. lOB Dassonville defines meas-
ures having equivalent effect as "[p)rovisions laid down by law, regula-
tion or administrative action, administrative practices and any practice 
of a public authority or which can be imputed thereto, precluding 
imports which might otherwise take place."l09 A ban on comparative 
advertising arguably can fall within this definition because it is an 
example of an action by public authority which could preclude imports 
which might otherwise take place. l1O 
The Court also applied article 30 to the comparative advertising 
setting in the case of Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft eV 
v. Yves Rocher GmbH [Yves Rocher).1l1 On May 18, 1993, the Court 
declared that German laws concerning price comparisons in print 
advertisements are inconsistent with article 30 of the Maastricht Treaty.ll2 
In that case, a German consumer action group brought suit against 
Yves Rocher claiming that the company's direct mail catalogs to Ger-
man consumers used price comparisons. ll3 While Yves Rocher lost the 
case in German court, the ECl determined that the German decision 
constituted a barrier to trade.ll4 
The German Unfair Competition Act bans German companies from 
making price comparisons in their advertisements. ll5 Due to the recent 
ruling, however, the EU will allow German lawmakers to enforce the 
Unfair Competition Act against German companies, but will prohibit 
its application to other EU Member States's companies.116 The EU 
stipulated that companies with head offices in other EU states are not 
obliged to comply with the German advertising law. ll7 The court based 
its ruling on article 30. 
108 See Case 8/74, Procureur du roi v. benoit and Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 852; 2 
C.M.L.R. 436 (1974). 
109 Id. at 84l. 
lIO See id. 
III See Case G-126/91, Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft eV v. \Yes Rocher 
GmbH, 1993 OJ. (C 172) 6. 
112 See id. 
II3 See id. 
1I4 See id. 
II5 See id. 
1I6 See Germany-Advertising Regulations, supra note 9. 
II7 See id. 
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The ECJ rulings in the INNO, Dassonville and Yves Rncher cases not 
only demonstrate the Court's tendency to rule in favor of dismantling 
barriers to trade but also highlight the need for a cohesive EU com-
parative advertising policy. The Yves Rncher ruling gives other Member 
States the advantage in Germany, leaving German retail companies and 
other manufacturers at an unfair disadvantage in their home coun-
try.lIS Furthermore, Germany loses its competitive edge by insisting that 
national companies follow this restrictive guideline while allowing EU 
companies to advertise in a more competitive manner. Thus, even if 
the Commission does not adopt the Amended Proposal, the Court has 
shown a slant in its favor. Moreover, even if the Court consistently rules 
in favor of lifting national restrictions, its rulings may create additional 
problems absent a cohesive EU policy. 
The ECJ balanced its interest in dismantling barriers to trade, how-
ever, by holding that under article 30 of the Maastricht Treaty, some 
national differences in the laws of Member States will survive if they 
can be justified under article 36 or as a "mandatory requirement" 
under article 30.119 Article 36 provides that in the realm of unfair 
competition, a Member State's law will survive the scrutiny of the court, 
even if it restricts the flow of goods across borders, if the means are 
the least restrictive possible to achieve the goal of the national law.120 
Thus, without a detailed directive on comparative advertising, a Mem-
ber State's law restricting comparative advertising would only be struck 
down if it did not fall within a "mandatory requirement" justification 
or was not the least restrictive means necessary to achieve the goal of 
the law. Therefore, to dismantle of trade barriers, the Commission 
needs to pass the Amended Proposal since restrictive national laws may 
nonetheless be upheld under the "mandatory requirements" test, the 
"rule of reason" exception, or the proportionality test of article 36. 
The holdings in the unfair competition cases may facilitate pan-
European advertising for companies within Member States with more 
liberal comparative advertising standards. Unless the countries with 
strict anti-comparative advertising laws conform to their more liberal 
118 See id. 
119 See, e.g., Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 2 C.M.L.R. 436 (1974); 
see also, Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur 
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979). 
120 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 61, art. 36. This is the principle of proportionality which 
imposes a "least restrictive means" test on a national law that restricts the flow of goods across 
Member State borders. Case 261/81, Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smedt PvbA, 1982 
E.C.R. 3961, 2 C.M.L.R. 496 (1983). 
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neighbors, companies based there will remain at a competitive disad-
vantage. Even with decisions such as the INNO case, the need for a 
directive to harmonize the comparative advertising practices in the ED 
remaIns. 
CONCLUSION 
The European Commission has taken steps, such as the Amended 
Proposal, toward the harmonization of Member States's laws on com-
parative advertising. In recent decisions, the ECl ruled in favor of 
rejecting restrictive national laws which prohibit the free movement of 
goods. Thus, if parties continue to bring cases regarding comparative 
advertising to the EC], the result could be the harmonization of laws 
since the Court has shown a tendency to value the free movement of 
goods across national borders over the restrictive national laws of the 
Member States. 
Subsidiarity may prove to be a barrier to the Commission's efforts at 
harmonization. Because the principle falls within the larger umbrella 
of the ED goal of the establishment of a Single Market, subsidiarity 
should not trump ED harmonization efforts. In any case, it is clear that 
the Member States's laws on comparative advertising differ enough to 
warrant Commission action, and the discussion is already outside of 
the subsidiarity realm. 
The impact of the Amended Proposal, if passed as a directive, in its 
current form, nonetheless may be minimal. Its vague terms still allow 
Member States to justifY their restrictive national laws while ostensibly 
remaining within the terms of the Amended Proposal. Such a vague 
directive would require the EC] to define the law in a more specific 
manner, if and when those seeking to use comparative advertising and 
those seeking to thwart it, bring their cases to the Court. 
The need for a cohesive ED comparative advertising policy remains. 
Even if the Amended Proposal is not adopted, the Court has shown 
itself to be in favor of liberalizing comparative advertising restrictions. 
Moreover, even if the Court consistently rules in favor of lifting na-
tional restrictions, its rulings may create additional problems absent a 
cohesive ED policy. 
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